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NOTE VERBALE DATED 11 JANUARY 1993 FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF GEORGIA ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Georgia presents its compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to transmit the statement of Mr. Kavsadze, envoy of the Head of State of the Republic of Georgia, Mr. E. Shevardnadze, to the Security Council on the situation in Georgia.

We would greatly appreciate it if this statement could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

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Annex

[Original: Russian]

The Abkhaz conflict in the Republic of Georgia

Report by Mr. Sandro Kavsadze, official representative of Mr. E. Shevardnadze, President of Parliament and Head of State of the Republic of Georgia

Exactly one year has passed since the authoritarian regime in Georgia was overthrown and the Republic set out to build a free, democratic State. Since then, the situation has been extremely tense. An especially grave state of affairs emerged in the western parts of Georgia, particularly Abkhazia. Here were concentrated armed bands which terrorized the local population and committed acts of sabotage - blowing up bridges and tunnels, damaging the railway and so on.

In these circumstances, the Georgian authorities had to take measures to neutralize the bands and establish law and order. It must be pointed out that these actions by the Government of the Republic of Georgia were not supported by certain local leaders in Abkhazia, as a result of which that part of western Georgia was in fact transformed into a sanctuary and a bridgehead for groups of terrorists and bandits. Heading the local authorities was a former deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Mr. V. Ardzinba. He was an active member of the "Union" bloc and was in charge of operations, together with Mr. Zhirinovsky, leader of the Russian Liberal-Democratic Party.

It is well known that the Union bloc and the party headed by Zhirinovsky comprised the most active opponents of democratic reforms and transformations in the Russian Federation.

As President of the Supreme Council of the Abkhaz Autonomous Republic, Ardzinba and his accomplices, not acknowledging the supremacy of the laws of the Republic of Georgia and acting from a position of strength, pursued a policy that ran counter to those laws and also the laws of the Abkhaz Autonomous Republic. Under the law on elections, Georgians, constituting 46 per cent of the population in Abkhazia, were represented in the Supreme Council of the Abkhaz Autonomous Republic by 26 deputies, while the Abkhaz, who made up only about 18 per cent of the population, were represented by 28 deputies. The remaining inhabitants (i.e., 36 per cent) of Abkhazia were represented by 11 deputies. That ratio enabled Ardzinba and his supporters to pursue a policy of apartheid. The leading positions, in violation of the lawfully-established rules, were filled predominantly by Abkhaz. The unlawful dismissal of the Minister for Internal Affairs of Abkhazia, a Georgian national, caused public outrage throughout the Republic. The illegal decision was backed by force: fighters supporting Ardzinba carried out a massacre in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, causing bodily harm to the Minister himself.

At the initiative of Mr. Ardzinba, an Abkhaz national guard was formed. That unlawful armed formation was, furthermore, composed along mono-ethnic lines - consisting exclusively of Abkhaz nationals - and as a result became the core of the rebel units.

Laws were adopted which restricted the freedom of movement of persons of non-Abkhaz nationality. Also in violation of existing laws, Georgian passports were issued to foreign subjects. Lastly, in July 1992 it was announced that the Abkhaz Constitution in force was being suspended.

In his address to the United Nations General Assembly at its forty-seventh session, Mr. Eduard Shevardnadze pointed out that a contemporary form of apartheid and an ethno-dictatorship had been instituted in Abkhazia, when the minority had become able to impose its will on the majority.

Mr. Ardzinba and his supporters openly sided with the terrorist organization "Confederation of Caucasian Mountain Peoples", which operated principally in areas of the western Caucasus of the Russian Federation. The capital of the Abkhaz Autonomous Republic, Sukhumi, was declared the capital of that Confederation. Ardzinba also created a special battalion as part of the armed formations of the confederation.

Meanwhile, the rampaging of the armed bands in the western parts of Georgia reached the point where it began to threaten the whole Republic. The railway - the major artery via which Georgia obtained its essential goods - was virtually blocked. The blowing up of bridges became a frequent phenomenon. Law-enforcement bodies were no match for bandits armed to the teeth. The Republic suffered colossal material damage. Georgia's neighbour, Armenia, found itself in a particularly difficult situation, the interruption of rail traffic bringing it to a state of seige. As a result of train robberies, Georgia owed Armenia more than 6 billion roubles at then-existing prices.

During those months, the opponents of democratic reforms both within Georgia itself and beyond its frontiers made all-out efforts to interrupt preparations for the elections to the Georgian Parliament.

At the beginning of July 1992, I took a journey through western Georgia, where I held meetings with representatives of the local population. Near the town of Tsalendzhikh, I and my fellow travellers were ambushed by armed assailants. One of my companions, the head of Administration of one of the districts, was killed on the spot. I was taken prisoner by terrorists, who carried me off to Abkhazia, where I spent 37 of my 40 days of imprisonment. At the beginning of August my fate was shared by more than 10 prominent officials captured by the terrorists. In addition to myself as Deputy Prime Minister, the Georgian Minister for Internal Affairs fell into the bandits' hands. All those taken prisoner at that time are able to confirm that the terrorists moved about freely and openly, both day and night, in the territory of Abkhazia.

In the light of that situation, the State Council of the Republic of Georgia took the decision to use Government troops to protect the railway, bridges and other means of communication and installations. Mr. Ardzinba was given prior notification of the decision by Mr. Shevardnadze, President of the State Council.

The ensuing course of events indicated that, by that time, Mr. Ardzinba and his accomplices had already made all the preparations for launching the anti-Government revolt.

At noon on 14 August 1992, acting upon instructions from Mr. Ardzinba, illegal Abkhaz armed formations suddenly opened fire on the Sukhumi battalion of Government troops. One guard was killed and several wounded. That was how the armed revolt began, how the ethnic conflict was provoked. The Government troops continued to move forward, overcoming the armed resistance of the rebels, and on 15 August took control of the railway station and other major installations in Sukhumi. At that same time the officials captured by the terrorists were released.

By that time Mr. Ardzinba and his accomplices had left Sukhumi, capital of the Abkhaz Autonomous Republic, and had set up base in the town of Gudauta. To avoid further bloodshed and possible casualties among the peaceful population, the Government forces halted their advance.

During the very first clashes, a significant number of hired terrorists were observed in the territory of Abkhazia, coming principally from the northern Caucasus. They had obviously been brought in previously; this is proved by the fact that Ardzinba and his clique, having enlisted the support of various forces, had already laid plans for the revolt and were merely looking for a pretext to begin it. It should be pointed out that the Confederation of Mountain Peoples, through a decree promulgated at that same time, had called for armed struggle against Georgia using terrorist means. That document is worth citing here. The decree states:

> "1. All headquarters in the Confederation shall arrange for the transport of volunteers to the territory of Abkhazia in order to put up armed resistance against the aggressors.
>
> "2. All armed formations of the Confederation, upon encountering resistance of any kind, shall engage in combat and shall strive to reach the territory of Abkhazia by any means.
>
> "3. The city of Tbilisi, capital of Georgia, is declared a disaster zone. In this connection, all means shall be used, including terrorist acts.
>
> "4. All persons of Georgian nationality in the territory of the Confederation are declared hostages.

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"5. All freight destined for Georgia and all means of freight transport shall be detained.

"6. Notifications of preparedness shall be communicated to the headquarters of the Confederation of Caucasian Mountain Peoples by 2400 hours on 22 August 1992."

The Confederation had succeeded in implementing part of its plans.

Mr. Ardzinba and his supporters did not conceal the presence of mercenaries in the rebel units. In his statements, Mr. Ardzinba described them as volunteers helping the Abkhazian people in their struggle against the occupiers and pointed out that houses and plots of land in the territory of Abkhazia were being given to them not as payment to mercenaries, but as a token of the gratitude of the Abkhazian people for their support. (It should be noted that these houses and plots of land belong to Georgian refugees.)

Meanwhile, the positions held by the Government troops, who had halted their offensive, were being subjected to constant attacks by rebel units. Taking advantage of the situation, the criminal bands of marauders and murderers stepped up their activities. In the situation thus created, Chairman Shevardnadze of the State Council of Georgia and President Yeltsin of th Russian Federation combined their efforts to put an end to the bloodshed. On 3 September 1992 in Moscow, Mr. Shevardnadze and Mr. Yeltsin signed the Final Document of the Moscow meeting. Mr. Ardzinba and representativrs of the northern Caucasus republics of the Russian Federation placed their signatures on the document.

In the document, the President of the Russian Federation and the Chairman of the State Council of the Republic of Georgia confirmed their commitment to the generally recognised principles of the territorial integrity of States and the inviolability of their borders, and respect for human rights and freedoms as well as the rights of national minorities.

In order to ensure the practical implementation of the provisions of the Final Document, a Verification and Inspection Commission was established, which included high-ranking officials from all sides concerned.

The Georgian authorities took specific steps to implement the provisions of the Final Document. In order to bring about a speedy cease-fire, the Government troops agreed to a compromise proposal and retreated a distance of 8 to 10 kilometres. Sukhumi and the adjacent territory virtually became a demilitarized zone and bloodshed was halted there.

The next important step was to disengage the sides along the Bzyb river. The resort cities of Gagra and Pitsunda were declared a demilitarized zone and came under the control of the observers. The leaders of the Gudauta group, however, in violation of the Moscow agreement, demanded and are continuing to demand the complete withdrawal of the Government troops. The rebel units, reinforced by terrorist mercenaries, repeatedly broke the cease-fire

agreement. On 1 October 1992, they attacked Gagra while a regular meeting of the Verification and Inspection Commission was being held in Sukhumi. I attended the meeting of the Commission and witnessed the events as they unfolded. The attempts by the members of the Commission to restore the status quo were not successful. The rebel units expanded their offensive, taking advantage of the small number of government troops (in accordance with an agreement they were withdrawn by the Georgian command), occupied the populated areas of Gantiadi and Leselidze and seized all the territory from the Gumista river to Georgia's border with the Russian Federation. During these days, more than 40,000 local inhabitants, primarily of Georgian nationality, fled their homes and crossed into the territory of the Russian Federation. Subsequently, they were housed in various regions of Georgia.

After the treacherous attack on Gagra, Mr. Shevardnadze visited the areas of Gantiadi and Leselidze and met with the people there. During one of the flights, his helicopter was attacked by an unidentified military helicopter, about which Mr. Shevardnadze made an official statement upon returning to Tbilisi.

It became clear that the Gudauta group was using the work of the Commission to gain time and achieve its goals.

According to data provided by the Committee on Human Rights and International Relations, as a result of the armed confrontation as of 14 January 1992, more than 600 persons had been killed, 2,150 had been wounded and approximately 600 were missing. The number of refugees exceeded 60,000 (we have accurate lists). This information was collected in the places that are under the control of Government troops. We have no corresponding information from the territory under the control of the Gudauta group. According to eyewitness accounts, a large number of houses, generally ones in which Georgians were living, were burned down. The peaceful population is not infrequently subjected to violence and torture. The exact number of persons killed is unknown.

The events that occurred in early October were preceded by a noticeable increase in activity by the opponents of reform and democracy in the Russian Federation. Under the influence of these forces the Parliament of the Russian Federation adopted, on 25 September 1992, a resolution that is at variance with the provisions of the Final Document of the Moscow Meeting and constitutes interference in the internal affairs of Georgia, and reports appeared in the Russian mass information media that gave a distorted account of the real state of affairs in Abkhasia.

Apparently, the actions by the Gudauta group serve well the interests of those who do not represent a republic of the former USSR any more than a province of the Russian Empire. In his original statement in Stockholm, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Mr. Kozyrev, painted a gloomy picture of what was to be expected if those forces were victorious in the Russian Federation.

I wish to point out that, in spite of the extremely complex situation, only 10 days after the Gagra tragedy, elections to the Parliament and for the post of Chairman of the Parliament were held in Georgia. These were truly democratic elections marked by great enthusiasm on the part of the entire population (elections were held in Abkhazia itself, except for Gudauta, Gagra and Tkvarcheli). Foreign monitors, representatives of various international organizations and journalists who had come to Georgia witnessed the fact that the people gave almost unanimous preference to democracy and expressed a high degree of trust in Chairman Shevardnadze.

From the very beginning of the armed confrontation in Abkhazia, the Government of Georgia has held the doors open wide to international organizations and representatives of information agencies, promoting in every possible way the collection of objective information about the events in Abkhazia. In the middle of September, a United Nations fact-finding mission arrived in Georgia, headed by the Director of the Europe Division of the Department of Political Affairs, Mr. Feissel. The delegation visited Abkhazia and met with representatives of the local authorities in Sukhumi as well as representatives of the Gudauta group led by Mr. Ardzinba. On 12 October a United Nations delegation led by Under-Secretary-General Blanca arrived in Georgia. This delegation also had meetings in Sukhumi and Gudauta. The situation in Abkhazia was objectively reflected in the letter dated 10 November 1992 from the United Nations Secretary-General, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/24794). At the present time, United Nations observers are maintaining an ongoing presence in Georgia. Representative delegations of CSCE actively seeking ways to bring about a peaceful settlement of the conflict also visited Georgia a number of times. Representatives of the organization International Alert who had visited the area of confrontation put forward interesting views on this subject. We are grateful to all for their participation and assistance.

I wish to inform the Security Council that our experts and specialists - political scientists, jurists, persons who have studied the nature of conflict and others - firmly reject the view that there is an ethnic conflict in Abkhazia. In actual fact, even now, after hundreds of people have been killed and tens of thousands have been left homeless in the region as a result of the armed confrontation, the local inhabitants have not started fighting among themselves. Furthermore, they frequently assist families that have suffered and lend one another a helping hand in critical situations.

Mr. Ardzinba and his associates have managed to draw only part of the population into their adventure. Many Abkhaz who do not wish to take part in the fighting against Government troops are leaving Abkhazia. It can be stated with confidence that the Gudauta clique relies in essence on mercenary forces. By contrast, the National Salvation Committee, which has been joined by many Abkhaz, comprises the forces of the Abkhaz public at large. Prominent representatives of the Abkhaz intelligentsia are demanding that Ardzinba and his associates curtail anti-Government activities and quit the political arena; they describe his activities as a betrayal, first and foremost, of the interests of the Abkhaz people.

Neither is there any religious strife between the Abkhaz and the Georgians. Some Abkhaz consider themselves to be Muslims, but there is no active religious movement in Abkhazia. In this as in all other parts of Georgia, people of different faiths have for centuries lived and are still living together in harmony.

In light of all the above, we may confidently affirm the absence of any ethnic conflict in Abkhazia and firmly hope that the bloodshed and armed strife in the region will rapidly be brought to an end.

The Provisional Government of the Abkhaz Autonomous Republic, based at Sukhumi, is currently effective in that part of Abkhaz territory which is controlled by Government troops. The Provisional Government is supported by the National Salvation Committee, which was established on the initiative of prominent representatives of the Abkhaz intelligentsia. However, a significant portion of Abkhaz territory is controlled by the Gudauta clique.

In accordance with the reality of the situation, Mr. E. Shevardnadze, President of Parliament and head of Government of the Republic of Georgia, has addressed an appeal to the members of the Security Council. He believes that they will take measures to settle the conflict in Georgia which ensure the protection of human rights as well as Georgia's territorial integrity and State sovereignty.

For our part, we put forward the following proposals for consideration by the members of the Security Council:

First of all, we consider that the Russian Federation could make a substantial contribution to the settlement of the conflict. We, for our part, are ready once again to embark on implementation of the provisions of the Final Document of the Moscow meeting (of 3 September 1992), provided that refugees are allowed to return to their places of permanent abode and that the positions of the parties as of 1 October 1992 are restored. We are well aware of the major difficulties involved in resolving a problem of this sort but we believe that it can, in principle, be done.

Effective use can be made, in action to settle the conflict, of United Nations observers and forces. In the first place, it seems to us highly desirable that United Nations armed units or observers should control the boundary between Georgia and the Russian Federation (with a view to preventing infiltration by illegal armed formations and illegal deliveries of weapons).

It is most important that the railway and basic communications also be placed under the control of United Nations forces or observers. A resumption of rail traffic is of vital significance for the peoples of Transcaucasia and especially for Armenia, where the situation is desperate.

United Nations forces and observers could also ensure compliance with the cease-fire in areas of armed conflict near the towns of Sukhumi and Tkvarcheli.

Representatives of the States of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics could serve among the United Nations forces. In this connection we feel it is very important that officers from other States Members of the United Nations should be included among the forces' commanders.

A cease-fire, a restoration of law and order and a return of refugees will make it possible to prepare for elections to the Parliament of the Abkhaz Autonomous Republic.

We are in turn prepared to discuss any reasonable proposal for a settlement of the conflict. In this regard, it might be useful to send a group of military observers to the areas of conflict, with specific mandates and control duties, for the purpose of studying the situation in Abkhazia on a multilateral basis, drawing up proposals based on their findings, and securing the agreement of the parties concerned.

The position of the Georgian authorities with respect to a cessation of the armed strife in Abkhazia is based on unqualified respect for two fundamental principles:

the inviolability of the territorial integrity and respect for the State sovereignty of the Republic of Georgia; and

the protection of human rights.

We welcome any proposals which are not inconsistent with these principles and which lead us to the desired objective - peace and prosperity for all the peoples of Georgia.

S. KAVSADZE

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-eighth session
REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE STRENGTHENING OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-eighth year

Letter dated 26 January 1993 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit, enclosed herewith, the letter of His Excellency, Mr. Dobrica Cosić, President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in the wake of the latest offensive by the Republic of Croatia against the Republic of Serbian Krajina (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under the item entitled "Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security", and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Dragomir DJOKIĆ
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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ANNEX

Letter dated 26 January 1993 from the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the Secretary-General

With regret and extreme concern I have to inform you that Croatia is ignoring all the measures taken so far by the United Nations, including the latest Security Council resolution, as well as by other international factors, and that it is intensifying its aggression against the Serbian people in the areas under the protection of the United Nations.

It is with cynicism, typical of aggressors, that the Croatian leadership is deceiving the world public about the limited targets of its armed operation in the Maslenički Bridge and Zemunik Airport regions, pursuing at the same time the war and extending the front. Today as well, on the fourth day of aggression, the Croatian army is pursuing its attacks with unabated force along the entire line of its offensive. Artillery units are destroying Serbian villages along the entire front line, exposing the Serbian people to persecution or annihilation and destroying the seventeenth century orthodox church in the village of Islam Grčki. The civilian population, mainly women, children and the elderly, are leaving their homes and fleeing in vast columns from the daggers and the fires of the Croatian army. Along the entire front line the Croats are bringing in reinforcements and concentrating fresh military forces and equipment. At this point, the aggressor has focused its main forces on the towns of Obrovac and Benkovac with a view to occupying and cutting them off so as to pursue the fighting towards Knin.

In order to achieve their objectives in the attacks against the towns of Obrovac and Benkovac, at certain points the Croatian commanders have concentrated large units and military might, which has as its consequence tremendously fierce fighting and extremely large numbers of victims.

The aggressor is not even sparing the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) units and is inflicting losses upon them as well, as a result of which the French battalion was forced to withdraw from the positions held so far.

It is high time for the world organization to take resolute measures in order to stop further aggression and persecution of the Serbian people, to force the aggressor to withdraw and punish him for the crimes committed. By doing so, the United Nations would, at the same time, be protecting its peace-keeping forces from new losses and enable them to perform their task.

Should there be no such action, an escalation of the war to extermination would be forthcoming inflicting a hard blow to the reputation and the authority of the United Nations.

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26 January 1993

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THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA

Progress report of the Secretary-General

1. The present report is the second report submitted to the Security Council pursuant to paragraph 17 of resolution 794 (1992) of 3 December 1992 on the situation in Somalia.

2. Section I of the report describes efforts undertaken to promote national reconciliation in Somalia. Section II concerns the military activities of the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) and the United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM). Section III concerns humanitarian activities. The report also contains four annexes.

I. EFFORTS OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND UNITY

3. As I previously reported to the Security Council (S/24992), I convened an informal preparatory meeting for a conference of national reconciliation and unity on Somalia at United Nations headquarters in Addis Ababa on 4 and 5 January 1993. Since additional time was requested by the participants, I authorized an extension of two more days to 7 January. In actual fact, the meeting did not conclude until 15 January 1993.

4. Twelve Somali political movements were initially invited to participate in the informal meeting. Two additional movements were invited at a later stage. A total of 14 political movements thus took part in the meeting. A list of those participating is contained in annex I.

5. Also attending the meeting were the Secretaries-General of the League of Arab States (LAS), the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Countries of the Horn, as well as the representative of the current Chairman of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.

6. On 4 January 1993, I opened the informal meeting at the headquarters of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) in Addis Ababa. The President of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia, H.E. Ato Meles Zenawi, delivered the keynote address. Statements were also made by the Secretaries-General and the representatives of the regional and intergovernmental organizations mentioned above.

7. At my suggestion, all the subsequent sessions of the meeting were attended by only the representatives of the Somali movements invited to participate. It was these sessions, which were conducted by chairmen elected from among the Somali representatives, that continued until 15 January 1993.

8. The following three agreements were concluded and signed at the informal meeting: (a) General Agreement of 8 January 1993; (b) Agreement on implementing the cease-fire and on modalities of disarmament (Supplement to the General Agreement); and, (c) Agreement on the establishment of an ad hoc committee to help resolve the criteria for participation at and the agenda for the national reconciliation conference as well as any other issues pending from the informal meeting. Copies of these agreements are contained in annexes II, III and IV, respectively.

9. Among other things, the informal meeting agreed on the convening of a national reconciliation conference in Addis Ababa on 15 March 1993. Although nearly all the Somali political movements preferred to hold the national reconciliation conference in Mogadishu, the lack of facilities in the city and security concerns argued against it. The meeting also agreed to an immediate and binding cease-fire in all parts of the country under the control of the signatories and to the immediate cessation of all hostile propaganda. Agreement was furthermore reached on disarmament and on monitoring the cease-fire, as well as on the release of prisoners-of-war.

10. It was agreed that the ad hoc committee will hold its first meeting in Addis Ababa on 22 January 1993 and submit its recommendations on the criteria for participation at the national reconciliation conference to the meeting of the whole before 1 March 1993. The committee will have a rotating membership and will be composed of seven members at any one time, with two of its members coming from the Somali National Alliance (SNA) and the remaining five from other political movements, with the proviso that the SNA could rotate its participants at every session of the committee.

11. As agreed, the first meeting of the ad hoc committee was convened in Addis Ababa on 22 January 1993. However, the meeting was suspended in order to consider an allegation by the SNA that the Somali National Front (SNF) had violated the cease-fire agreement of 15 January 1993. According to the SNA, several towns in the Galgadul region in the south were attacked and captured by the SNF. Neither UNOSOM nor UNITAF was able to confirm the allegation. The meeting could not be reconvened because the SNA decided not to participate. In a statement they issued, the other five participants in the committee called the suspension unjustified because alleged violations of the

cease-fire fell under the competence of the Cease-fire Monitoring Committee and should not be a reason to suspend the first meeting of the ad hoc committee.

12. The informal meeting failed to agree on the agenda for the national reconciliation conference but decided that the question should be addressed by the ad hoc committee.

13. The General Agreement requests the United Nations, in consultation with the relevant regional and subregional organizations, to provide logistic support both prior to and during the conference. The former concerns the availability of telecommunications and printing facilities as well as road and air transportation. ECA, in cooperation with UNOSOM, is expected to service the conference.

14. The crisis in Somalia can only be resolved by the Somali people themselves, through a process of national reconciliation. The process will be long and difficult. It will require dedication, compromise and the utmost seriousness of purpose. It is hoped that the conference will be a forum where representatives of all Somali movements, factions and groups will have the opportunity freely and fully to express their views. It will provide a mechanism for negotiating an end to the major disputes in the country. Through the negotiation process, an agreement acceptable to all - and carried out by all - can be achieved. It needs to be noted that the Security Council has from the beginning of its consideration of the situation in Somalia urged all parties to the conflict in Somalia immediately to cease hostilities and agree to a cease-fire and to promote the process of reconciliation and of political settlement in the country.

15. As I stated at the informal preparatory meeting, the international community attaches the highest importance to national reconciliation in Somalia. Regional organizations are committed to this process as well. It would still be preferable to convene meetings on national reconciliation in Somalia. Beyond its obvious symbolic significance, Somalia, as a venue, could provide added impetus and urgency to the search for a political solution.

II. MILITARY ACTIVITIES

16. A major preoccupation for UNOSOM at the present juncture is the planning for the transition from the operations of UNITAF to UNOSOM II. This planning exercise is proceeding smoothly in close cooperation and consultation with the Command of UNITAF. The planning for UNOSOM II includes plans for deployment of troops to northern Somalia and it will also cover appropriate proposals for demining, as reliable information indicates that there are several million mines in the country, most of them uncharted. The major concentration of mine-fields is to be found in the north where UNITAF has not been deployed.

17. The first preparatory step for accelerating the transition to UNOSOM II will be the strengthening of the headquarters of the UNOSOM military component.

In this connection, the Secretary-General has authorised the addition of 30 officers to UNOSOM headquarters. A new Force Commander for UNOSOM II will be appointed shortly so that he can participate effectively in the planning process for the transition as well as the transfer of the operation from UNITAF to UNOSOM. A number of the Member States cooperating with the United States in UNITAF have expressed their willingness to have their contingents serve with UNOSOM II under a new mandate. I will present recommendations to the Security Council on the composition of the new UNOSOM as soon as it is practicable. It will be my intention, for obvious reasons of practical convenience and economy, to include in the new UNOSOM as many contingents as possible which are currently deployed in Somalia, and serving under the command of UNITAF.

18. As indicated in paragraph 12 of my report to the Security Council of 19 December 1992 (S/24992), I have initiated a series of meetings that bring together all the participating Governments of UNITAF and UNOSOM so as to give an opportunity to the troop-contributing countries to participate in discussions about the current operations of the Force and planning for the transition to UNOSOM II. The first of these meetings took place on Wednesday, 13 January 1993 and the second is scheduled for 26 January 1993.

19. UNOSOM's military component currently has a strength of 634 all ranks. It is composed of a 500 all ranks battalion, 50 military observers, movement and logistics elements, a headquarters company and a small headquarters staff. After the adoption of resolution 794 (1992), further deployment into Somalia was put on hold pending assessment of conditions on the ground. In addition to the augmentation of UNOSOM headquarters mentioned in paragraph 2 above, it has been decided to authorize the deployment of an additional 250 soldiers from Pakistan to augment and enhance the flexibility of the Pakistani Infantry Battalion. As indicated in paragraph 17 above, 30 officers will shortly join the headquarters of UNOSOM.

20. It must be noted that a separate report submitted by the United States on the achievements of UNITAF has been circulated to the Security Council (S/25126).

21. UNITAF must be congratulated for rapidly and successfully securing major population centres and ensuring that humanitarian assistance is delivered and distributed without impediment. Whilst the general security situation has improved considerably, the security threat to the personnel of the United Nations, UNITAF and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) is still high in some areas of the city of Mogadishu and other places, including Bardera, Bale Doble and Baidoa. Inter-clan fighting still tends to break out from time to time, along with sniper attacks. Within the past few weeks a staff member of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), one United States marine and one delegate of the International Committee of the Red Cross were killed in incidents of this kind.

22. It is important to note that the primary responsibility for the implementation of the Addis Ababa agreements lies with the Somalis themselves.

At the same time, UNITAF and UNOSOM will have important functions in assisting the Somalis in their task of discharging these responsibilities. In the area of disarmament, it will be necessary to monitor the weapons and technical vehicles which will have been placed under the supervision of the cease-fire monitoring group. This will present a particular difficulty in the north, where there is no UNITAF or UNOSOM military presence at this stage. Consequently, there is no ready capability to assist in the disarming exercise in that region, even if a decision were to be taken to do so. A related problem concerns the fact that if the north were not to be disarmed effectively or if the disarmament were not to be monitored by the international community, the factions in central and southern Somalia might hesitate to implement the agreement as such implementation would place them at a disadvantage. There is also the question of encampment of the troops of the various factions and their upkeep and retraining until a new Somali Government is formed. These issues would be reviewed with the UNITAF command to determine the nature of the UNITAF/UNOSOM response to the recommendations of the Addis Ababa Informal Preparatory Meeting.

23. The establishment of a Somali police force will be a crucial step in the efforts of UNITAF and UNOSOM to create a secure environment in Somalia for the purposes of humanitarian assistance and political reconciliation as well as for the rehabilitation of the country. I have therefore decided to send an expert team to Somalia which, under the guidance of my Special Representative, will prepare a plan for the establishment of a neutral police force in Somalia. In the meantime, under the supervision of UNITAF, working in close cooperation with UNOSOM, an auxiliary force composed of former police officers is being constituted in Mogadishu. This group could be entrusted with certain security functions under the guidance of UNITAF and subsequently UNOSOM.

III. HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES

24. The arrival of UNITAF forces has opened up access to more remote areas and has enabled the delivery of relief food and other essential supplies, such as medicines, vaccines and water equipment. Between 10 December 1992 and 20 January 1993, 13 vessels of the World Food Programme (WFP) and other relief organisations carrying humanitarian supplies have berthed in Mogadishu port. Some 40,000 tons of humanitarian relief supplies have been delivered to Somalia through Mogadishu port and its main airport. This included 8,000 tons of medical drugs, seeds, tools and veterinary supplies.

25. In addition to greater security, the efficiency of Mogadishu port has greatly improved; extortion payments have been stopped and the port itself and its buildings have been cleaned and minor construction work undertaken. Extensive salvage operations are also planned to fully open the port of Kismayo.

26. At Mogadishu main airport, security is provided by UNOSOM and UNITAF; electric lighting has been installed and the airport is now open 24 hours of the day. Air traffic control has been established and its capacity to handle

aircraft has been expanded. Improvements have also been made to the airports at Baledogle and Baidoa. Dirt airstrips at Hoddur, Belet Weyne and Bardhere have been upgraded.

27. Access is being further increased through repair work on six major relief supply routes. These are: Mogadishu-Baledogle-Baidoa; Baidoa-Bardhere; Baidoa-Wajit-Hoddur; Mogadishu-Kismayo; Kismayo-Bardhere; Mogadishu-Jalalaqsi-Belet Weyne. Mines have been cleared from the Baidoa-Wajit-Hoddur road. Improved security has allowed WFP to bring some of its extensive truck fleet into Somalia from Ethiopia. This has accelerated the amount of relief supplies which can be delivered and has served to reduce the exceedingly high prices previously charged by local truck owners. Without the help of UNITAF, this would not have been possible.

28. Since the arrival of UNITAF, many new NGOs are establishing programmes in central and southern parts of Somalia. Many existing NGOs, as well as the United Nations system, have significantly increased their staff so that relief activities can be expanded.

29. Of the total food delivered, 25,000 tons brought into Mogadishu have been delivered by escorted road convoys to people in need in the Mogadishu area, Kismayo, Baidoa, Bardhere, Merca, Jalalaqsi, Hoddur and Belet Weyne. An additional 9,000 tons have been airlifted to Saco Uen, Kismayo, Baidoa, Bardhere, Wajit, Hoddur, Jalalaqsi and Belet Weyne. One hundred tons of food supplies have been airdropped to Afmadu and in the Jelib region.

30. In conjunction with WFP, CARE is establishing dry ration distribution in Mogadishu. Some 12,000 tons of food supplies will be delivered to people in the city per month. Thirty per cent of the food will be distributed in the form of dry rations to displaced persons and others in severe need. NGOs are supervising the programme, working closely with Somali women's groups. The remaining 70 per cent will be monetized in small lots through local traders. The first shipment of wheat flour has already been sold and the funds generated are being made available to NGOs for labour-intensive projects. UNITAF will escort convoys from the port to the sites and will also be present during the distributions to deter would-be looters.

31. A shipment of 3,000 tons of food arrived in Kismayo around 22 January 1993. This is the first shipment since the port was closed because of insecurity at the end of September 1992.

32. WFP has shipped 1,000 tons of food to Bosasso in the north-east. On 17 January 1,350 tons of food arrived in the north-western port of Berbera and a further 200 tons has been shipped from Djibouti to the seaports of Zeila and Hait in northern Somalia.

33. Provision of assistance by UNICEF markedly increased following the Geneva Conference on Somalia in October 1992 with the launching of the United Nations 100-Day Programme of Action and the subsequent arrival of UNITAF. UNICEF's objectives focused on improving access to food supplies, supplementary feeding

for the vulnerable and "at-risk" population, provision of essential health services, provision of safe water and improvement of sanitary conditions, and relief assistance and support for resettlement and the resumption of agricultural activities.

34. UNICEF continues to provide medicines, drugs and support to 16 hospitals, 62 mother and child health centres and 156 health posts throughout Somalia. In December, some 60,000 children were vaccinated against measles and given vitamin A supplements. In collaboration with the World Health Organization (WHO) and NGO partners, epidemiological assessments have been conducted in four regions of Somalia. UNICEF continues to support 14 international NGOs providing assistance to 136 supplementary feeding centres, feeding over 200,000 children per day.

35. Work is under way to repair, install and rehabilitate water supply systems, while efforts are being made to improve the sanitary conditions. Over 18,000 families have received agricultural tools and seeds through the joint UNICEF/OXFAM programme for agricultural communities in Lower Juba and Lower Shebelle, and seeds and tools have been distributed to small-scale farmers in 71 villages.

36. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has assisted in the restoration of the Mogadishu water supply system, and has been instrumental in the successful sanitation clean-up programme in the city. Similar efforts are under way in other urban centres. A major UNDP mission is under way in north-western Somalia, identifying rehabilitation projects as well as schemes to help rebuild administrative services. UNDP is also assisting the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), WHO and UNESCO to extend their activities throughout Somalia by providing the usual logistics, administrative and financial support. UNDP has significantly increased its international staff presence following the arrival of the UNITAF.

37. UNESCO has recently re-established its presence in Somalia and is very active, along with NGOs and other United Nations agencies, in reopening schools and in assisting in the provision of educational materials. FAO has expanded its activities considerably and is providing essential assistance to the thousands of displaced families so that they have the seeds, tools and other agricultural equipment to resettle in home villages and re-establish livestock herds. FAO is also providing much-needed animal health assistance in an attempt to rehabilitate the pastoral economy, a mainstay of much of the Somali population. WHO has continued to provide significant assistance to the health sector providing NGOs with material assistance, essential drugs and technical advice, especially in the areas of malaria and tuberculosis. Along with UNICEF and a number of NGOs, WHO has opened a central pharmacy in Mogadishu, and assisted in the development of an epidemiological surveillance system.

38. The improved access and security in some areas has enabled health and nutrition assessments to take place. Some of these assessments have been made with helicopter transportation provided by UNITAF. Agricultural surveys to determine harvests and hence food needs for 1993 are also being undertaken.

39. Security forces in the hinterland are also involved in assisting local communities through improved water supplies and support for health facilities. Another positive aspect of UNITAF is the increase in commercial activities. Markets are functioning again and commercial vessels are using the ports of Mogadishu and Kismayo.

40. As regards coordination, the Humanitarian Operations Centre (HOC), which was established in Mogadishu to serve as the interface between UNITAF and the relief community, has worked exceptionally well. UNITAF liaison personnel have been attached to UNOSOM's Humanitarian Division since the start of the operation. The Operations Coordination Structure enables the different partners involved in the delivery of humanitarian assistance to discuss security issues, convoy escorts and requests for emergency assistance. Attended by representatives of the security forces provided by the various countries, this forum provides the relief community with a unique opportunity to share information and raise issues that have an impact on relief efforts.

41. Humanitarian Operations Centres have also been established at Baidoa, Kismayo, Belet Weyne, Huddor, Bardhere and Jalalaqsi.

42. The Operations Coordination Structure also includes a 12-member Standing Liaison Committee representing all international partners in the relief effort. This Committee meets on a weekly basis to discuss problems which have arisen and to propose solutions.

43. In spite of the many positive aspects of the presence of UNITAF forces, the risk to relief workers remains exceedingly high. Theft, looting and extortion continue to plague relief efforts, albeit on a lesser scale. The recent murder of UNICEF and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) staff only serves to highlight the dangerous climate in which relief workers continue to operate.

44. Insecurity has also adversely affected the planning of future relief operations. UNICEF was planning to establish a presence in the Mudug and Galgadud regions in early December. Increased insecurity in these regions, however, has resulted in the decision to postpone the programmes. In the north-eastern portion of the country, an area previously considered relatively secure, increased troop movements and fighting amongst rival groups have adversely affected plans by aid agencies and NGOs to establish relief programmes in the region. The security situation in Kismayo has improved as UNITAF patrols have been stepped up and a local police force created. All five UNICEF supplementary feeding centres are operating and UNICEF is continuing its support to health facilities in Lower Juba.

45. Concerns are growing about the movement of technicals into border areas with Kenya and Ethiopia. The problems created by armed gangs in refugee camps in Kenya recently prompted the authorities to threaten to oust Somali refugees residing in that country. The destabilising effect of such movements into these countries as well as the lurking threat which they pose for any future stability in Somalia itself are matters which must be addressed.

Future plans

46. It will be recalled that the United Nations 100-Day Action Programme for Accelerated Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia was reviewed at the Second Coordination Meeting held in Addis Ababa from 3 to 5 December 1992. In addition to reviewing progress made under the plan, the Meeting provided an opportunity for Somali leaders and indigenous NGOs to forge a stronger degree of partnership with United Nations Agencies and international NGOs in planning and implementing relief and rehabilitation activities.

47. One of the major conclusions of the Meeting was that the 100-Day Programme should be followed by a new plan for 1993 which should also address rehabilitation and reconstruction. It was further agreed that the participation of Somali representatives in the planning process of future programmes was fundamental.

48. With these considerations in mind, a Relief and Rehabilitation Programme for 1993 is in the process of being finalised. Core groups, comprising representatives of the United Nations system and international and indigenous NGOs, are collaborating closely in formulating activities in the sectors of food security, health, water and sanitation, food production, livestock, basic education, and resettlement of displaced people and refugees. In order to ensure that requirements in different parts of the country are adequately taken into consideration, inputs from different regions are being obtained with assistance from regional Humanitarian Operations Centres.

49. In spite of the difficulties in the country, a major effort is being made to ensure the involvement of the Somalis themselves in planning programmes designed to move as quickly as circumstances permit from relief to rehabilitation and reconstruction.

50. The Relief and Rehabilitation Programme will include activities covering all parts of Somalia and its effective implementation will be contingent upon the existence of adequate security. This applies to areas currently covered by the Unified Task Force in the central and southern parts of Somalia as well as to the north-east and the north-west. As part of the Programme, steps will be taken to rebuild civil administrations and to establish police forces.

51. A United Nations Conference on Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia will be held in Addis Ababa in March 1993 to review the Relief and Rehabilitation Programme and receive pledges from donors. The active involvement of a wide spectrum of Somalis is indispensable to the effective implementation of the Programme. Every effort will therefore be made to achieve broad Somali participation in the Conference. This Conference could be held immediately after the United Nations Conference on National Reconciliation in order to minimize cost and to maximize Somali participation. A positive outcome of the Humanitarian Conference could provide added incentives for the national reconciliation process.

Annex I

Somali Africans Muki Organisation (SAMO)

Somali Democratic Alliance (SDA)

Somali Democratic Movement (SDM)

Somali National Democratic Union (SNDU)

Somali National Front (SNF)

Somali National Union (SNU)

Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM)

Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM)(sna)

Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF)

Southern Somali National Movement (SSNM)(sna)

United Somali Congress (USC)(sna)

United Somali Congress (USC)

United Somali Front (USF)

United Somali Party (USP)

Annex II

The General Agreement signed in Addis Ababa on 8 January 1993

We, the undersigned Somali political leaders, meeting at the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 4 January 1993 at the Informal Preparatory Meeting on National Reconciliation in Somalia, would like to thank the Secretary-General of the United Nations, H.E. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who has facilitated this meeting in collaboration with the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Standing Committee of the Horn of Africa.

We also thank the Government and people of Ethiopia, and H.E. Meles Zenawi, President of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia, for hosting the Meeting and for his personal engagement in assisting our efforts to reach the following agreement.

We, the Somali participants, further express our deep appreciation for the concern of the international community for the humanitarian crisis in our country and recognize their wish for us to reach a peaceful solution to our country's severe problems.

After discussing our problems and considering all options, we have agreed on the following points:

1. The convening of a National Reconciliation Conference in Addis Ababa on 15 March 1993;

2. The declaration of an immediate and binding cease-fire in all parts of the country under the control of the concerned warring factions, subject to paragraph (a) below;

3. The immediate cessation of all hostile propaganda against each other and the creation of an atmosphere conducive to reconciliation and peace;

4. The United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), in consultation with the relevant regional and subregional organizations, will be responsible for the logistical preparations of the National Reconciliation Conference;

5. The establishment of further mechanisms for the continuation of free dialogue amongst all political factions and leaders in Somalia in preparation for the National Reconciliation Conference;

6. To continue and enhance our full and unrestrained cooperation with all international organizations working inside and outside Somalia to distribute humanitarian relief to our people;

7. To commit ourselves, without reservation, to facilitating the free movement of Somali people throughout the entire country as a measure of confidence-building before the National Reconciliation Conference.

This agreement shall be valid upon completion and adoption by consensus on the following three points, and a separate communiqué will be issued before leaving Addis Ababa:

a. The establishment of the modalities for implementing the cease-fire amongst all warring parties and the creation of a mechanism for disarmament;

b. The agenda of the National Reconciliation Conference;

c. The criteria for participation in the National Reconciliation Conference.

This agreement, signed in Addis Ababa on 8 January 1993, shall be considered binding on all the undersigned parties henceforth and all signatories shall be obliged to secure the support and implementation of this agreement amongst their movements and followers.

1. Somali Africans Muki Organization (SAMO)
   Mr. Mohamed Ramadan Arbow, Chairman:

2. Somali Democratic Alliance (SDA)
   Mr. Mohamed Farah Abdullahi, Chairman:

3. Somali Democratic Movement (SDM)
   Abdi Muse Mayo, Chairman:

   Col. Mohamed Nur Aliyou, Chairman: (SNA)

4. Somali National Democratic Union (SNDU)
   Mr. Ali Ismael Abdi, Chairman:

5. Somali National Front (SNF)
   General Omar Hagi Mohamed Hersi, Chairman:

6. Somali National Union (SNU)
   Dr. Mohamed Ragis Mohamed, Chairman:

7. Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM)
   General Aden Abdillahi Noor, Chairman:

8. Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) (sna)
   Col. Ahmed Omar Jess, Chairman:

9. Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF)
   General Mohamed Abshir Musse, Chairman:

10. Southern Somali National Movement (SSNM) (sna)
    Col. Abdi Warsame Isaaq, Chairman:

11. United Somali Congress (USC) (sna)
    General Mohamed Farah Aidid, Chairman:

12. United Somali Congress (USC)
    Mr. Mohamed Qanyare Afrah, Chairman:

13. United Somali Front (USF)
    Mr. Abdurahman Dualeh Ali, Chairman:

14. United Somali Party (USP)
    Mohamed Abdi Hashi, Chairman:

January 8, 1993
Addis Ababa, ETHIOPIA
Africa Hall

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Annex III

Agreement on implementing the cease-fire and on modalities of disarmament

(Supplement to the General Agreement signed in Addis Ababa on 8 January 1993)

We, the undersigned Somali political leaders, meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 15 January 1993 at the Informal Preparatory Meeting on National Reconciliation in Somalia;

Having agreed on the need for a viable and verifiable cease-fire to promte the peace process in Somalia;

Recognizing that such cease-fire is intricately linked to questions of disarmament;

Further recognising that disarmament cannot be accomplished in a single event but through a sustained process;

Hereby agree on the following:

I. Disarmament

1.1 All heavy weaponry under the control of political movements shall be handed over to a cease-fire monitoring group for safekeeping until such time as a legitimate Somali Government can take them over. This process shall commence immediately and be completed in March 1993.

1.2 The militias of all political movements shall be encamped in appropriate areas outside major towns where the encampment will not pose difficulties for peace. The encamped militias shall be disarmed following a process which will commence as soon as possible. This action shall be carried out simultaneously throughout Somalia. The international community will be requested to provide the encamped militias with upkeep.

1.3 The future status of the encamped militia shall be decided at the time of the final political settlement in Somalia. Meanwhile, the international community will be requested to assist in training them for civilian skills in preparation for possible demobilisation.

1.4 All other armed elements, including bandits, shall be disarmed immediately and assisted through rehabilitation and integration into civil society.

II. Cease-fire monitoring group

2.1 A cease-fire monitoring group comprising UNITAF/United Nations troops shall be established immediately. There shall also be a committee composed of representatives of the warring factions to interlocute with the monitoring group and observe the implementation of the agreement by UNITAF/United Nations troops.

III. All sides agree in principle that properties unlawfully taken during the fighting shall be returned to the lawful owners. This shall be implemented as and when the situation allows.

IV. All POWs shall be freed and handed over to the International Committee of the Red Cross and/or UNITAF. This process shall commence immediately and be completed by 1 March 1993.

The present agreement shall enter into effect on 15 January 1993.

1. Somali Africans Muki Organization (SAMO)
   Mr. Mohamed Ramadan Arbow, Chairman

2. Somali Democratic Alliance (SDA)
   Mr. Mohamed Farah Abdullahi, Chairman

3. Somali Democratic Movement (SDM)
   Mr. Abdi Muse Mayow, Chairman

   Col. Mohamed Nur Aliyou, Chairman (sna)

4. Somali National Democratic Union (SNDU)
   Mr. Ali Ismael Abdi, Chairman

5. Somali National Front (SNF)
   General Omar Hagi Mohamed Hersi, Chairman

6. Somali National Union (SNU)
   Dr. Mohamed Ragis Mohamed, Chairman

7. Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM)
   General Aden Abdillahi Noor, Chairman

8. Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) (sna)
   Col. Ahmed Omar Jess, Chairman

9. Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF)
   General Mohamed Abshir Musse, Chairman

10. Southern Somali National Movement (SSNM) (sna)
    Col. Abdi Warsame Issaq, Chairman

11. United Somali Congress (USC) (sna)
    General Mohamed Farah Aidid, Chairman

12. United Somali Congress (USC)
    Mr. Mohamed Qanyare Afrah, Chairman

13. United Somali Front (USF)
    Mr. Abdurahman Dualeh Ali, Chairman

14. United Somali Party (USP)
    Mr. Mohamed Abdi Hashi, Chairman

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15 January 1993, Addis Ababa

Annex IV

Agreement on the establishment of an ad hoc committee, signed in Addis Ababa, on 15 January 1993

We, the undersigned Somali political leaders, meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 15 January 1993 at the Informal Preparatory Meeting on National Reconciliation in Somalia;

Determined to continue our efforts to resolve all pending issues from the Informal Preparatory Meeting, in particular, the question of criteria for participation at and the agenda for the National Reconciliation Conference scheduled to begin on 15 March 1993;

Further determined to ensure the immediate implementation of all agreements reached during the Informal Preparatory Meeting;

1. Hereby decide to establish an Ad Hoc Committee to continue the discussion aimed at resolving the question of criteria for participation and the agenda for the National Reconciliation Conference, as well as any other issues pending from the Informal Preparatory Meeting;

2. The Ad Hoc Committee, whose sole purpose is to provide a mechanism for continuing the search for a solution to outstanding issues, shall work in consultation with all Somali political movements;

3. The Ad Hoc Committee shall hold its first meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 22 January 1993;

4. The Ad Hoc Committee shall submit its recommendations on the criteria for participation at the National Reconciliation Conference and on other outstanding issues to the meeting of the whole before 1 March 1993;

5. The following facilities, to be utilized solely for the purpose of carrying out the mandate set out in the present agreement, shall be placed at the disposal of the Ad Hoc Committee: an office in Mogadishu and Addis Ababa to facilitate consultations with the United Nations and the relevant regional and subregional organizations, as well as telecommunication and transportation facilities;

6. The Ad Hoc Committee shall be composed of seven members at any one time with two coming from the SNA and five from the other political movements. The SNA shall have the right to rotate its participatnts at every session of the Ad Hoc Committee if it so wishes;

7. Notwithstanding the pending status of the agenda and the issue of criteria for participation at the National Reconcilitation Conference, the General Agreement signed in Addis Ababa on 8 January 1993 shall enter into force with immediate effect.

1. Somali Africans Muki Organization (SAMO)
   Mr. Mohamed Ramadan Arbow, Chairman

2. Somali Democratic Alliance (SDA)
   Mr. Mohamed Farah Abdullahi, Chairman

3. Somali Democratic Movement (SDM)
   Mr. Abdi Muse Mayow, Chairman

   Col. Mohamed Nur Aliyou, Chairman (SNA)

4. Somali National Democratic Union (SNDU)
   Mr. Ali Ismael Abdi, Chairman

5. Somali National Front (SNF)
   General Omar Hagi Mohamed Hersi, Chairman

6. Somali National Union (SNU)
   Dr. Mohamed Ragis Mohamed, Chairman

7. Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM)
   General Aden Abdillahi Noor, Chairman

8. Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) (sna)
   Col. Ahmed Omar Jess, Chairman

9. Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF)
   General Mohamed Abshir Musse, Chairman

10. Southern Somali National Movement (SSNM) (sna)
    Col. Abdi Warsame Issaq, Chairman

11. United Somali Congress (USC) (sna)
    General Mohamed Farah Aidid, Chairman

12. United Somali Congress (USC)
    Mr. Mohamed Qanyare Afrah, Chairman

13. United Somali Front (USF)
    Mr. Abdurahman Dualeh Ali, Chairman

14. United Somali Party (USP)
    Mr. Mohamed Abdi Hamdi, Chairman

15 January 1993, Addis Ababa

UNITED NATIONS

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General Assembly Security Council

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-seventh session
Agenda item 45
QUESTION OF CYPRUS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-eighth year

Letter dated 26 January 1993 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

With reference to the latest developments on the question of Cyprus and the unanimously adopted Security Council resolution 789 (1992), I have the honour to forward attached herewith a copy of a relevant resolution adopted by the European Parliament on 21 January 1993 (see annex). This resolution, inter alia, reaffirms the European Parliament's support for all United Nations Security Council resolutions on Cyprus, welcomes the recently adopted Council resolution 789 (1992) and fully supports the implementation of the confidence-building measures contained therein.

As will be recalled, the Government of the Republic of Cyprus promptly and unequivocally stated its acceptance of the said confidence-building measures (see A/47/736-S/24862 and A/47/759-S/24914 dated 27 November and 7 December 1992, respectively), a fact that is duly noted and welcomed by the European Parliament in its said resolution.

Meanwhile, and in spite of the fact that two months have elapsed since the adoption of Security Council resolution 789 (1992), the Turkish side has regrettably not only failed to accept the confidence-building measures, a fact that can reasonably be expected to be of serious concern to the Security Council, but on the contrary has with numerous statements publicly challenged Council resolution 789 (1992) and, through provocative and menacing statements emanating from the highest level of the Turkish leadership, has created a climate of tension, thus undermining whatever prospects may exist for the forthcoming talks in March 1993. Characteristically, the Prime Minister of Turkey, Mr. S. Demirel, quoted in the Turkish daily Milliyet (22 January 1993), said that nothing can happen in Cyprus if Turkey does not

want it, that Cyprus is the honour and pride of Turkey and that (the Cypriots) "will regret that their mothers gave birth to them. The airport at Adana is only six minutes away from Nicosia".

I shall be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 45, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) A. J. JACOVIDES
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
of the Republic of Cyprus
to the United Nations

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ANNEX

Resolution adopted by the European Parliament on 21 January 1993

Regarding Security Council resolution 789 (1992) adopted on 25 November 1992 on Cyprus and the Republic's relations with the European Community,

The European Parliament,

Recalling its previous resolutions on Cyprus,

Having in mind the Association Agreement between the European Economic Community and Cyprus as well as the application of the Republic of Cyprus for accession to the European Community,

Having in mind the talks which took place in New York and the ensuing Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations of 19 November 1992 regarding his mission of good offices,

Reaffirming its support for all United Nations Security Council resolutions on Cyprus, including 365 (1974), 367 (1975), 541 (1983), 550 (1984) and 774 (1992),

Welcoming the recent unanimous Security Council resolution 789 (1992) of 25 November 1992,

Fully supporting the urging of the Security Council, as contained in its resolution 789 (1992) towards the interested parties, to implement a series of confidence-building measures, which would greatly facilitate the promotion of the appropriate climate for the successful completion of the efforts for finding a just and viable solution of the Cyprus problem in the course of March 1993,

Welcoming also the readiness expressed by the Cyprus Government to the Secretary-General of the United Nations to cooperate for the immediate implementation of the confidence-building measures,

Welcoming the establishment of the European Community-Cyprus Joint Parliamentary Committee,

1. Adopts the position of the Security Council that the talks in New York did not achieve their intended objective "in particular because certain positions adopted by the Turkish Cypriot side were fundamentally at variance with the Set of Ideas";

2. Reaffirms its conviction that the continuation of the status quo in Cyprus in unacceptable and poses wider (threats) danger to the region;

/...

3. Calls upon the Turkish side to return to the new round of talks in March 1993 with positions in line with the resolutions of the Security Council, including 365 (1974), 367 (1975), 541 (1983), 550 (1984), 774 (1992) and 789 (1992), as well as with the Set of Ideas of the Secretary-General of the United Nations;

4. Calls upon the Government of Turkey to withdraw its occupation troops from the Republic of Cyprus in accordance with the relevant United Nations resolutions, and calls for the Turkish troops to be replaced by United Nations peace-keeping forces;

5. Calls upon the Turkish side to accept without further delay the confidence-building measures adopted by Security Council resolution 789 (1992) and to cooperate with the other interested parties for their immediate implementation;

6. Supports the recommendations of the European Community-Cyprus Joint Parliamentary Committee adopted at Nicosia on 16 July 1992 and, in particular, expresses the wish that the Opinion of the Commission on the application of Cyprus for full membership to the European Community and the decision of the Council that will follow, contribute to the furtherance of the admission of Cyprus to the Community which will have positive effects on the efforts for the solution of the Cyprus problem;

7. Calls upon the Ministers convening within the framework of European political cooperation to take all necessary steps that would ensure respect for Security Council resolution 789 (1992) and in particular implementation of the confidence-building measures foreseen by it;

8. Calls in particular upon the Council and the Commission, in cooperation with the Cyprus Government, the United Nations Secretary-General and other interested Governments and international organizations, to:

(i) Help in conducting studies and in initiating action for the restoration of Famagusta (Varosha) as soon as the town is placed under United Nations administration according to Security Council resolutions 550 (1984) and 789 (1992);

(ii) Proceed to the financing through loans or grants of bicommunal projects in Cyprus as foreseen by Council resolution 789 (1992);

9. Instructs its President to convey the present resolution to the Governments of member States, the United Nations Secretary-General and the Governments of Turkey and Cyprus.

UNITED NATIONS

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26 January 1993
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THE SITUATION CONCERNING WESTERN SAHARA

Report by the Secretary-General

INTRODUCTION

1. In his letter to me dated 31 August 1992 (S/24504) the President of the Security Council, commenting on my latest report on Western Sahara dated 20 August 1992 (S/24464), confirmed the Council's agreement to maintain the existing deployment and staffing of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), while expecting a further progress report by the end of September 1992. However, as intimated to the President in my letter of 2 October 1992 (S/24644), I deemed it appropriate, to defer my next report until the second half of November 1992 in the expectation that I would then be able to give a full account of the outcome of various consultations, including a meeting of tribal chiefs from Western Sahara. Subsequently, in a letter dated 16 November 1992, I informed the President of my intention to postpone further the submission of my report until the second week of December 1992, since the meeting of tribal chiefs could not be organized before the end of November 1992. Lastly, as I advised the President in my letter of 22 December 1992 (S/25008), I felt it necessary further to postpone my report until the second half of January 1993.

2. The present report is divided into five sections. Section I describes the military aspects of MINURSO. Section II is devoted to other aspects, including major activities and developments since my last report to the Council dated 22 August 1992. Section III deals with events and circumstances in the mission area which have a bearing on MINURSO's role and activities, without pertaining directly to its current mandate. Section IV dwells on the financial aspects of the operation. Finally, section V embodies my own conclusions and recommendations.

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I. MILITARY ASPECTS

3. As of 20 January 1993, the military component of MINURSO totalled 328 personnel including, 228 military observers and 100 support personnel.

(a) United Nations military observers and headquarters personnel:

Argentina	7
Australia	2
Austria	1
Bangladesh	1
Belgium	1
Canada	16
China	20
Egypt	9
France	30
Ghana	1
Greece	1
Guinea	1
Honduras	14
Ireland	6
Italy	6
Kenya	10
Malaysia	1
Nigeria	1
Pakistan	1
Poland	2
Russian Federation	30
Switzerland	1
Tunisia	8
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	15
United States of America	28
Venezuela	15
Subtotal (a)	228
(b) Signals Unit: Australia	43
(c) Movement control: Canada	16
(d) Medical Unit: Switzerland	41
Total	328

4. In addition, 103 civilian staff members, 69 of whom are internationally recruited and 34 locally recruited, were assigned to MINURSO in support of its military mandate. This figure does not include pilots and other crew members of two fixed-wing aircraft and five helicopters provided by the companies from which the aircraft have been leased.

5. As reported in my letter dated 16 September 1992 to the President of the Security Council (S/24579), the tour of duty of Brigadier-General Luis Block Urban from Peru, who had served as Acting Force Commander of MINURSO since 24 April 1992, came to an end on 30 September 1992. Following the usual consultations, I appointed Brigadier-General André Van Baelen of Belgium to the post of Acting Force Commander, with effect from 1 October 1992.

6. Pending the fulfilment of the conditions necessary for the commencement of the transitional period in accordance with the timetable and plan of action set out in S/22464 and Corr.1, MINURSO's military mandate remains restricted to monitoring and verifying the cease-fire in effect since 6 September 1991. I am pleased to report that there were no breaches of the cease-fire resulting in casualties on either side and that violations were without exception of a non-violent nature. Still I have noted with concern a reversal in the downward trend in the number of violations discerned during the period 29 May to 20 August 1992 when only six violations were reported by the MINURSO Force Commander a.i. By contrast, no less than 50 violations were reported in the period 20 August to 20 January 1993, with 46 of them attributed to Morocco and 4 to the Frente POLISARIO. Of the former violations, 22 related to overflights, 13 to improvements of defensive works and 11 to unauthorized troop movements. On the Frente POLISARIO side, all four violations involved troop movements without prior notification and permission. Additionally, the POLISARIO filed complaints alleging 24 overflights over and above the 22 which could be confirmed by MINURSO's own observations.

7. Even though there have been no explosions affecting MINURSO personnel since my last report, minefields continued to pose grave danger to MINURSO patrols in the performance of their duties. As stressed in earlier reports, it is essential that both parties make available, without delay, all existing charts and other information indicating the exact location of mines. Meanwhile, the observers continue to abide by existing instructions not to stray from well-beaten and familiar routes. But inevitably, such restrictions detract from the ability of MINURSO to carry out its mandate in the most efficient manner possible.

8. The Swiss Medical Unit continued to provide efficient medical services to MINURSO personnel. Because of the continuing uncertainty about MINURSO's full deployment, the Swiss authorities suggested, and I agreed, to a reduction in the strength of the Medical Unit, which dropped from 59 to 41 by 20 January 1993. As part of this reduction, the clinic in Dakhla has been dismantled and as of 6 December the clinic in Smara was reduced to a forward medical post with a capacity limited to emergencies and medical evacuations.

9. I wish to express my appreciation to the Governments contributing military observers to MINURSO. Furthermore, I take this opportunity to express my warm thanks to Brigadier-General Block for the diligence with which he led MINURSO from 24 April until 30 September 1992. I also wish to pay a tribute to his successor, Brigadier-General Van Baelen, and to all the men and women, both military and civilian, under his command. They have performed

with efficiency and devotion the tasks assigned to them by the Security Council.

II. OTHER ASPECTS

10. At the invitation of the current Chairman of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, President Abdou Diouf of Senegal, my Special Representative, visited Dakar from 9 to 11 September 1992 in order to brief the Chairman on the current status of the settlement plan co-sponsored by the OAU. While expressing concern at the protracted impasse in the settlement process, President Diouf gave assurances of continuing support of the OAU for ongoing efforts to overcome obstacles as well as for any new initiatives for reactivating the settlement plan.

11. My Special Representative then visited the mission area from 10 to 15 October 1992. In Rabat he was received by King Hassan II. Subsequently, he met the Secretary-General of the Frente POLISARIO, Mr. Mohammed Abdelaziz, in Tindouf. Before returning to New York, he met in Algiers for the first time with President Ali Kafi and separately, with the Prime Minister, Mr. Belaid Abdeslam. On his return to New York, my Special Representative briefed the Permanent Representative of Mauritania to the United Nations on the outcome of his mission.

12. As I indicated in my letter of 2 October 1992 to the President of the Security Council (S/24644), the talks between my Special Representative and each of the parties concerning the interpretation of the criteria for eligibility to vote annexed to my predecessor's report of 19 December 1991 (S/23299) began at United Nations Headquarters on 25 August 1992 and continued until 25 September 1992. The annex to the present report provides an account of the results of these talks, which dealt with the interpretation of the criteria and other relevant instructions set out in the annex to the said report, concerning, in particular, evidence in support of individual applications for participation in the referendum.

13. In this context, it is worth recalling at the outset the basic positions of Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO regarding the provisions of the settlement plan (set out in document S/21360 and elaborated further in document S/22464) which relate to the establishment of the electorate.

14. In paragraph 61 of document S/21360, the plan for the implementation of the proposals for the settlement of the question of Western Sahara stipulates that the Identification Commission will implement the agreed position of the parties that all Western Saharans counted in the 1974 census undertaken by the Spanish authorities and aged 18 years or over will have the right to vote, whether currently present in the Territory or outside as refugees or for other reasons. The detailed report on the implementation of the settlement proposals (S/22464) stipulates, in paragraph 20, that the Identification Commission's mandate to update the 1974 census will include (a) removing from the lists the names of persons who have since died and (b) considering

applications from persons who claim the right to participate in the referendum on the grounds that they are Western Saharans and were omitted from the 1974 census.

15. In this connection, Morocco maintains that all persons having Saharan status should have the right to participate in the referendum and that, accordingly, Saharans who for various reasons were omitted by the Spanish authorities in 1974 should be considered on the same basis as those who were counted; hence, Morocco regards the list of persons counted in 1974 as a point of reference for the establishment of the electorate. For its part, the Frente POLISARIO maintains that, in the initial agreement, the two parties agreed that the 1974 list would be the sole basis of the electorate and that, accordingly, the Saharans counted in 1974 should constitute the vast majority of persons authorized to participate in the referendum, while Saharans omitted from the census should constitute an exception to that group. The two parties thus have radically opposing points of view concerning the relevant provisions of the settlement plan, with one attaching primary importance to the list of persons counted in 1974 and the other considering that its importance is relative.

16. It should also be recalled that my predecessor, in setting out the instructions relating to the tasks of the Identification Commission, including the criteria for eligibility to vote, as annexed to the report of 19 December 1991 (S/23299), believed that they constituted a just and fair basis for the monitoring of the referendum. For the reasons outlined in the preceding paragraph, Morocco, while considering these criteria to be unduly restrictive, nevertheless accepted them. The Frente POLISARIO, however, considered that these criteria would unduly expand the electorate beyond the 1974 list; since it viewed the 1974 census as a key provision of the settlement plan, to which the two parties had agreed and which could not be changed without their consent, the Frente POLISARIO rejected these criteria on the ground that they were incompatible with the relevant provisions of the plan.

17. The parties' opposing points of view concerning the basic question of the establishment of the electorate largely accounts for their differences, as made clear in their recent talks with the Special Representative, with regard to both the interpretation of the criteria and the equally important question of evidence in support of applications for participation in the referendum. In this connection, the Frente POLISARIO emphasized the special importance of written evidence emanating from the Territory, in other words, authentic documents issued by the Spanish authorities in the Territory, while Morocco emphasized the equal importance, in a nomadic and traditional society, of oral testimonies and official documents, regardless of their source.

18. Since the outcome of these talks was not conclusive, I agreed, as mentioned in my letter to the President of the Security Council dated 2 October 1992 (S/24644), that my Special Representative should undertake further consultations with a view to clarifying certain unresolved questions. We also informed the members of the Security Council of our intention to try

to determine with the parties whether a meeting of tribal chiefs such as that organised by the United Nations at Geneva in June 1990 could contribute to the resolution of the problems impeding the implementation of the settlement plan.

19. Further to the letter from the President of the Security Council dated 8 October 1992 (S/24645) welcoming such an intention, my Special Representative decided, in consultation with the parties, to invite 38 Western Saharan tribal chiefs to a consultative meeting on 30 November and 1 December 1992 at the Palais des Nations in Geneva. The Special Representative had sent both parties a letter to that effect on 11 November 1992. The participants, of whom 19 had been designated by the Government of Morocco and 19 by the Frente POLISARIO, were to advise the Special Representative on questions relating to the means of identifying persons authorised to participate in the referendum to be organized by the United Nations in Western Sahara.

20. Regrettably, because of differences relating to the powers of some participants designated by the Moroccan party, this consultative meeting had to be cancelled, despite the compromise proposals put forward by the Special Representative to the delegations of both parties at Geneva.

21. On the understanding that a separate meeting could not take the place of the advisory meeting which could not be held, the Special Representative received, at the request of the Moroccan party, the delegation of notables designated by Morocco, who presented him with a document to apprise him of their point of view. The delegation designated by the Frente POLISARIO did not request a similar meeting.

III. THE SITUATION IN MISSION AREA

22. As I advised the Council in my report of 20 August 1992 (S/24464, paras. 10-12), the Government of Morocco had announced its intention to hold a referendum on constitutional reform as well as municipal and legislative elections within the coming months. For reasons explained to my Special Representative during his visit to Rabat in early August and confirmed in a letter from Morocco's Minister for Foreign Affairs to me dated 21 August 1992 (S/24484, annex) the Government of Morocco was reluctant to consider postponing these plebiscites. The Foreign Minister's letter states, inter alia, that the holding of the referendum and the national elections could not in any way be linked to the referendum to be held under the United Nations settlement plan, "because of the radically different nature and objectives of the two consultations".

23. The referendum on constitutional reform which was held on 4 September 1992 resulted in the adoption of a series of proposed amendments to the Moroccan Constitution, one of which introduces the "Region" as a new administrative subdivision. In a public address on 8 September 1992, King Hassan II announced that Western Sahara would form the first such Region and enjoy priority in terms of development.

24. On 16 October 1992, municipal elections were held in Morocco and in the Territory of Western Sahara. Various incidents involving demonstrators were reported in the Territory of Western Sahara both before and after these elections. In two instances, on 8 and 9 October respectively, a group of youths entered the MINURSO sub-headquarters at Smara in connection with disturbances there. In both cases, the youths left the compound of their own volition accompanied by MINURSO personnel after appropriate assurances had been sought and obtained from local authorities.

25. Subsequently, in various communications addressed to me, my Special Representative and the Force Commander of MINURSO, the Frente POLISARIO reported grave incidents allegedly involving violence and arrests throughout the Territory. While confirming the occurrence of public demonstrations in the Territory related to the electorial campaign, Morocco denied these allegations. It is pertinent to recall that while MINURSO's current military mandate is strictly limited to the monitoring and verification of the cease-fire, MINURSO, as a United Nations mission, could not be a silent witness to conduct that might infringe the human rights of the civilian population. Hence MINURSO patrols were alerted to possible unrest. Their reports did not corroborate the allegations made by the Frente POLISARIO.

26. In letters recently addressed to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and myself, Morocco has strongly urged investigation into allegedly serious aspects of the situation prevailing in the camps at Tindouf, Algeria. I shall inform the Council, as appropriate, should there be any findings that bear on MINURSO'S mandate and might warrant the Council's attention.

IV. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

27. The General Assembly, by its resolution 45/266 of 17 May 1991, appropriated an amount of $143 million gross ($140 million net) for the operation of MINURSO. As at 30 November 1992, there was a projected balance of $70.8 million gross ($70 million net) remaining from this appropriation. Should the Security Council decide to extend MINURSO, assuming continuation of its existing functions, appropriate financial commitments will be sought from the General Assembly or through the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions. As at 30 November 1992 unpaid assessed contributions to the MINURSO special account amounted to approximately $21 million.

V. OBSERVATIONS

28. The settlement plan for Western Sahara contained in my predecessor's report to the Security Council of 18 June 1990 (S/21360) and amplified and complemented with a detailed timetable in his further report of 19 April 1991 (S/22464 and Corr.1) is based on proposals to which the parties had freely agreed in August 1988. Moreover, both parties were extensively consulted on all major aspects of the aforementioned reports before they were issued and subsequently approved by the Security Council. The resultant plan was

designed to serve as a definite and agreed framework for the entire settlement process, starting with a cease-fire and culminating in a referendum, without the need for negotiating any further agreements for elaborating the details of the plan. It soon became evident, however, that notwithstanding the prior acceptance of the general provisions of the settlement plan, there were important substantial disagreements between the parties regarding fundamental issues. As underlined in paragraph 55 of my predecessor's report of 19 April 1991 amplifying the settlement plan, the full cooperation of both parties is an essential condition for the holding of the referendum. Faced with this situation, my predecessor and senior members of his staff worked closely with representatives of both parties in the final months of 1991 in an effort to arrive at a workable compromise. It was the consummation of this painstaking endeavour that was reflected in the annex to the Secretary-General's report of 19 December 1991.

29. In the intervening period, in spite of intensive efforts exerted by me and my Special Representative, it has unfortunately not been possible to resolve the dilemma that impinges on the very core of the settlement plan. These efforts have included my Special Representative's talks with the parties on safeguards and guarantees in June and July of last year, the results of which were described in my report of 20 August 1992 (S/24464); a further round of talks concerning documentary and oral evidence in August and September 1992; and, lastly, an attempt to organize a meeting of tribal chiefs in Geneva at the end of November 1992.

30. The results of my Special Representative's talks with the parties concerning documentary and oral evidence and testimony to be used and accepted for the identification of voters are described in the annex to the present report. Understandably, the differences between the two parties on the issues involved mirror their respective positions on what ought to be the composition of the electoral body. One of the parties advocates liberal use of both documentary and oral evidence from different sources, whereas the other party insists on much more restrictive rules in this regard. It was with this specific end in view that I agreed with the proposal of holding a meeting of tribal chiefs at the end of November 1992 so that such a conclave might help in defining the elements of a compromise.

31. Whatever hopes for a compromise that might have existed were frustrated at the meeting of tribal chiefs in Geneva for the reason explained in paragraph 20 above. This set-back demonstrates starkly the futility of the efforts undertaken with vigour and resource by my Special Representative over the past eight months to seek a way out of the existing deadlock. It is indeed disappointing that the rules established in agreement with the parties for the selection of participants were not strictly respected by all concerned. But I find it even more regrettable that the parties failed to prove equal to the test of making an effort to reach a relatively straightforward compromise on the holding of a meeting, the main purpose of which went no farther than to provide me and my Special Representative with advice on the procedures for the identification of voters eligible to participate in the referendum.

32. The above review describes the developments that have taken place since my last report to the Security Council on 20 August 1992. Three broad options would now seem to be available:

(a) Continuation, and if possible, intensification of talks. It is my considered opinion, however, that the chances for success under this option are very slim;

(b) Immediate implementation of the settlement plan on the basis of the instructions for the review of applications for participation in the referendum appearing in the annex to my predecessor's report of 19 December 1991 (S/23299). This may mean that the implementation would have to proceed without the cooperation of one of the parties;

(c) A third option would be to adopt an alternative approach not based on the settlement plan.

33. In the light of the above considerations, I am requesting guidance from the Security Council on how best to proceed. Evidently, given the background as well as the critical stage which has been reached, this guidance should be given by way of a resolution of the Security Council.

34. Depending on the Council's decision, the role and the strength of MINURSO will have to be adjusted. Likewise, revised budget estimates will have to be drawn up and approved. I shall formulate the corresponding plan and estimates in the light of the Council's decision and seek the necessary approval.

Annex

INTERPRETATION BY THE PARTIES OF THE CRITERIA FOR ELIGIBILITY TO VOTE AND OTHER INSTRUCTIONS RELATING TO THE TASKS OF THE IDENTIFICATION COMMISSION

1. As the Secretary-General mentioned in his letter of 2 October 1992 to the President of the Security Council (S/24644), the Special Representative of the Secretary-General held a series of talks with each of the parties from 25 August to 25 September 1992 on the interpretation of the criteria for participation in the referendum to be organized by the United Nations in Western Sahara, in accordance with the plan for the implementation of the settlement proposals (set out in document S/21360 of 18 June 1990 and elaborated further in document S/22464 of 19 April 1991). Here follows an account of the outcome of those talks, during which the parties presented their respective interpretations of the criteria for eligibility to vote and other instructions relating to the work of the Identification Commission, annexed to the report of the Secretary-General of 19 December 1991 (S/23299).

I. CRITERIA FOR ELIGIBILITY TO VOTE

2. The Frente POLISARIO continued to stress that, as stipulated in the settlement plan agreed by both parties, the persons listed in the 1974 census constitute the sole basis of the electorate and that the criteria set out in the annex to the report of 19 December 1991 were incompatible with this key provision of the plan. The Frente POLISARIO emphasized throughout the talks that its readiness to discuss the interpretation of the December 1991 criteria at the request of the Special Representative in no way implied acceptance thereof. Nevertheless, the Frente POLISARIO stated that it was prepared to accept the criteria as a whole on one condition: sole reliance, for purposes of verification, on the authentic documents issued by the Spanish Territorial authorities. Morocco, which considered those documents to be less than satisfactory but accepted the criteria set out in document S/23299, continued to insist on their immutability in order to prevent a reopening of the debate on that issue and thereby prevent any backward movement.

3. The criteria set out in the annex to document S/23299 can be regrouped into five criteria:

1. Persons whose names are included in the revised 1974 census list (para. 23);

2. Persons who were living in the Territory as members of a Saharan tribe at the time of the 1974 census but who could not be counted (para. 25);

3. Members of the immediate family of the first two groups (father, mother and children) (paras. 23 and 26);

4. Persons born of a Saharan father born in the Territory (para. 29);

5. Persons who are members of a Saharan tribe belonging to the Territory and who have resided in the Territory for six consecutive years or intermittently for 12 years prior to 1 December 1974 (paras. 30 and 31).

4. The talks dealt specifically with the interpretation of criteria 4 and 5, which present the Frente POLISARIO with the greatest problems in terms of applicability, compatibility and legality with regard to the relevant provisions of the settlement plan (S/21360 and S/22464).

A. Criterion 4

5. Both parties agreed that, in implementing the provisions of paragraph 29 of the annex to the report contained in document S/23299, proof of the father's birth in the Territory is a sine qua non for eligibility. However, the convergence of views on criterion 4 is limited to this point.

6. For the Frente POLISARIO, criterion 4 constitutes a derogation from the provisions of paragraphs 24 and 25 of document S/21360 and is consequently unacceptable. The Frente POLISARIO remains open to any compromise proposals on this issue. Having nevertheless agreed to discuss with the Special Representative the interpretation of criterion 4 as worded, the Frente POLISARIO pointed out that the provisions of that criterion suffered from omissions and contradictions. Specifically, criterion 4 as interpreted by the Frente POLISARIO does not accord the right to vote to a father born in the Territory; in contrast, it lets persons who may be foreign to the Territory to participate in the referendum.

7. Morocco considers it logical that a father, conferring Saharan status on an individual, should automatically have the right to participate in the referendum. Accordingly, the limitation to a single generation applies solely to subsequent generations (that is, to an individual's children) and not to prior generations (i.e. to the individual's father).

B. Criterion 5

8. The Frente POLISARIO insists that this criterion must take into account the dates on which the States bordering Western Sahara gained independence, dates which it considers to be points of reference required under the plan to mark the internationally recognized boundaries of the Territory. To be eligible to vote on the basis of criterion 5, then, a person who was outside the Territory at the time of the 1974 census, in Morocco, Mauritania or Algeria, would have to prove that he had resided for six consecutive years or

intermittently for 12 years in the Territory during the periods from 1958 to 1974, 1960 to 1974 or 1962 to 1974 respectively.

9. Noting the nomadic character of Saharan society and the displacement which occurred as a result of the colonial presence in the Territory, as well as the hostile reactions of Saharan residents to colonization, Morocco believes that length of residence should be calculated as of 1884, the inception of Spanish colonization of the Territory.

II. SUPPORTING EVIDENCE

10. The instructions annexed to the report of 19 December 1991 call for two types of evidence which individuals must furnish in support of their application to participate in the referendum: "official documents, well known to the Saharans and used by them" and "oral testimonies [...], given under appropriate conditions" (para. 32).

A. Official documents

11. Throughout the talks, the Frente POLISARIO held that the problems relating to evidence only complicated the problems relating to criteria other than the 1974 census. Any person omitted from that census and not indigenous to the Territory could in fact claim by fraudulent means that he was entitled to participate in the referendum. Basing itself on the principle that no one but the Saharan people may determine that people's future, the Frente POLISARIO insists that any proof submitted in support of an application can come only from the Territory. In the case of documents, this means only authentic documents issued by Spanish Territorial authorities, such as identity cards, residency permits, family record books and passports. The Frente POLISARIO considers that written evidence originating in the two parties to the conflict is politically motivated and thus cannot be impartial. Stressing that one's affiliation with Western Sahara can be proved only by documents from the Territory, the Frente POLISARIO maintains that documents from any other source, including Algeria, Mauritania and the former French Protectorate of Morocco, cannot be considered.

12. Morocco disputes the impartiality of the Spanish colonial authorities but considers acceptable in principle any authentic official documents regardless of their origin, provided that the Identification Commission can verify their authenticity and that the written evidence can be corroborated by oral testimony. Morocco has cited as examples of official documents: birth, death and marriage certificates, particularly to support applications to participate in the referendum based on criterion 4; royal dahira, chiefly to certify membership in certain tribal groups in the Territory; and certificates issued by an adl, to support applications to participate on the basis of any one of the eligibility criteria.

B. Oral testimony

13. For the Frente POLISARIO, oral testimony may be solicited (a) to certify an individual's tribal affiliation and (b) to provide physical identification of an individual (confirming that a person claiming to be X is actually X). Only sheikhs belonging to an individual's subfraction and included in the list of sheikhs drawn up by the Spanish Territorial authorities can give such testimony. These witnesses must swear on the Koran before the appointed cadi that they will tell the whole truth and nothing but the truth. Citing the natural limitations of memory over events that occurred in the early years of the century and the risk that psychological and economic pressure might be exerted on the sheikhs, the Frente POLISARIO is opposed to oral testimony in support of applications made on the basis of criteria 4 and 5. For the same reasons the Frente POLISARIO will not accept any substitution of oral testimony for written evidence.

14. Morocco, on the other hand, maintains that, in cases where an individual has no documents, testimony by sheikhs and other tribe members can take the place of written evidence if it is given according to Saharan tradition and customs. Morocco specified in this connection that oral testimony can be given by two udul or 22 witnesses; testimony can also be given in a form recognized by the tribe or certified by the cadi.

III. TRIBAL AFFILIATION

15. Paragraph 21 of the annex to the report of 19 December 1991 stipulates that, "for actual identification, it is the membership of a family group (subfraction of a tribe) existing within the Territory, which can be attested to by the sheikhs and notables of the family group, that should eventually prevail for eligibility to participate in the referendum".

16. Both parties agree that membership in a tribe does not in itself entitle an individual to participate in the referendum. The individual must in all cases meet one of the criteria for eligibility in order to vote in the referendum.

17. The Frente POLISARIO considers a subfraction to be established in the Territory if the majority of its members were counted in the 1974 census and believes that any individual omitted from the census list should be included in a subfraction that meets this condition. Morocco rejects this interpretation as arbitrary and inconsistent with historical and geographical facts.

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

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S/25171
27 January 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 26 JANUARY 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to transmit the enclosed fifth submission of the Government of the United States of America, dated 18 January 1993, as requested by paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 771 (1992) and paragraph 1 of Security Council resolution 780 (1992).

I would be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Edward J. PERKINS

Annex I

Supplemental United States submission of information to the United Nations Security Council in accordance with paragraph 5 of resolution 771 (1992) and paragraph 1 of resolution 780 (1992)

This is the fifth submission by the United States Government of information pursuant to paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 771 (1992) relating to the violations of humanitarian law, including grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, 1/ being committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. As in our previous reports, we have focused on grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and, in accordance with resolution 771 (1992), have provided information that is "substantiated", that is, which rests upon eyewitness testimony directly available to us or that includes detail sufficient for corroboration. For the moment, we have also tried not to duplicate information provided to us from other countries and non-governmental sources, which we understand will submit reports pursuant to resolutions 771 (1992) and 780 (1992). The information provided is intended to be useful to the Commission of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 780 (1992). The United States has further information substantiating the incidents included in the present report, which we will make available directly to the Commission of Experts on a confidential basis.

In accordance with paragraph 1 of resolution 780 (1992), the United States intends to continue providing reports as additional relevant information comes into its possession.

We wish to note that, in addition to the categories of violations of humanitarian law and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions cited in our previous reports, we have added a new category, "Impeding delivery of food and medical supplies to the civilian population".

As in our previous reports, the notations at the end of each of the items indicate the source from which the information was drawn. Unless otherwise indicated, the reports refer to incidents occurring in 1992.

Annex II

Former Yugoslavia: Grave breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention

FIFTH SUBMISSION

Wilful killing

8 January 1993	A Bosnian Serb army soldier killed Bosnian Deputy Prime Minister Hakija Turajlic on 8 January. Mr. Turajlic was sitting inside a United Nations vehicle at a United Nations command post near Sarajevo's airport. French General Morillon, a United Nations Commander in Bosnia, blamed the commander of the Bosnian Serbs' Lukavica corps for the assassination. (The Washington Post)
January	Armed Serbian groups are killing and wounding people of all ages every day, destroying abandoned Muslim and Croat buildings and looting homes and stores in Banja Luka and in the surrounding countryside, according to witnesses. (Department of State)
14 December 1992	Bosnian Muslim forces from Srebrenica killed at least 60 Serbs, mostly civilians, in villages near the Bosnian town of Bratunac, according to a resident of the town. As a result of the hostilities, up to 5,000 people, primarily women, children, elderly and wounded, have fled across the Drina River into Ljubovija from the Bosnian villages of Bjelovac, Sikiric, Voljevica, Jugovici and Loznicka Rijeka. (Department of State)
September	A 44-year-old Muslim witnessed Serbian soldiers beating four men in early September outside a detention facility in Batkovic. Two were able to enter the facility; another two young men did not have the strength to flee the beating. Four or five soldiers continued attacking those two until one of them, about 20 years old, died. The second bled from the ears and was so badly injured that he could not recognize his own father, a fellow prisoner. Fifteen men were killed during his stay at Batkovic camp. The witness was able to identify the most brutal of the guards at Batkovic. (Department of State)
September	A 44-year-old Serbian civilian, who had been detained in Celebici since 30 May, witnessed the beating deaths of 15 or 16 Serbs by a Muslim guard and the deputy camp director, Asem Delic - a "green beret" (member of the Bosnian Muslim paramilitary forces in Konjic). (Department of State)

24 July

A 39-year-old Bosnian Muslim from Prijedor, who was held in Keraterm camp from 31 May until 5 August, witnessed the 24-25 July massacre at Keraterm camp. Although we have reported the massacre in previous reports, this witness provided some additional details about the events on the evening of 24 July.

The witness was in the room next door, where he could see much of what took place because the large factory doors separating the rooms had slats with openings between them. He said that soon after the disturbances in the room next door had begun, he saw two trucks full of soldiers drive into the camp.

Floodlights were turned on, and three additional machine-guns were brought from the trucks and placed next to the two that had already been in the camp. All five machine-guns were used to fire into the room. At around six the next morning, the witness was among the prisoners chosen to load bodies into the trucks. He said they stacked more than 100 bodies in the trucks, piling them in three layers. (Department of State)

26 June

A 19-year-old Serbian civilian from Visoko witnessed the beating death of Milivoje Samardzic when Muslims arrested him and brought him to Visoko camp. He identified those responsible for the death. (Department of State)

20 June

A 27-year-old Serbian civilian from Okolisce, a village near Visoko, witnessed the killing of six unarmed Serb civilians by a Bosnian Territorial Defence soldier on 20 June in Okolisce. He witnessed these shootings from his neighbour's house, and stated that among the victims were the wife and son of a Serb neighbour. During this attack, a Muslim neighbour saved the life of the witness.

Later on 20 June, this man witnessed the beating death of Bosko Rakovic at Visoko camp by a Muslim guard whom he identified. (Department of State)

13 June

A 24-year-old Serbian civilian from Visoko was arrested with his father and two brothers by Bosnian Muslim Territorial Defence Forces on 13 June. He witnessed the beating to death of Slobodan Gogic on that day. Pointing to a wound on his elbow as evidence of his own torture, the witness identified those who had beaten him, Gogic and other prisoners. (Department of State)

Torture of prisoners

May-October 1992 — A 33-year-old Muslim doctor from Prijedor, who had been interned in Trnopolje camp from 25 May until his release to the Karlovac transit centre for ex-detainees on 1 October, described the operation of a medical clinic in Trnopolje camp - the only reported clinic in any of the camps in the Prijedor area.

Trnopolje is a small village within the municipality of Kozarac, about 6 kilometres away. It lies on the railroad track between Prijedor and Omarska. Most maps identify it as "Kozarac Station". Trains came often through Trnopolje traveling to Banja Luka. Women, children, boys under 16, men over 65 and the very sick were loaded on through trains; able-bodied men remained in Trnopolje.

The witness said that Serbian soldiers wandered through Trnopolje camp nightly, brutally beating the male prisoners and randomly raping female prisoners. They did this with the knowledge and permission of camp guards stationed at several locations in Trnopolje.

The witness examined some of the raped women but was not allowed to indicate on any documents that they had been raped. The doctors kept a log of patients for a few weeks, until they were stopped by the Serbs. The doctors were not allowed to indicate in the log that patients had been beaten or raped, but the witness and others used a code to indicate who had been raped and beaten. The witness smuggled these logs out of the camp and turned them over to the Muslim Club of Kozarac in Zagreb.

Several times the employees of the clinic came under suspicion and their lives were threatened. One of the female aides was a Serb, and she was repeatedly interrogated and told to stop working at the clinic, but she stayed. The witness believes the presence of this Serb saved the lives of the other staff many times. (Department of State)

May-October — Serbian paramilitary police picked up a 44-year-old Muslim on 14 May and drove him to a kindergarten on the western side of Zvornik. There one member of the paramilitary beat him with a stick for one hour, while another aimed his pistol at him, and a third went through documents. The witness said the three were Serbs from Serbia, not Bosnia. They wore white belts and camouflage fatigues.

The witness and another captive were driven about five minutes to a former textile plant called "Alhos". The facility was occupied by many Serb soldiers, but he and the other Muslim appeared to be the only prisoners at that time.

They were kept for several days in a small room, which was stained with what they assumed was the blood of earlier prisoners. They were generally left alone until 16 May, when from 8 p.m. until 4 a.m. the following morning, they underwent the most severe and intensive beating during four months of captivity. Three Serbs carried out the beatings, two of whom he recognised from the area around Svornik.

The two men were forced to stand against the wall and sing Serbian nationalist songs. Unfamiliar with the lyrics, the two Muslims were beaten by the soldiers with fists, boots and rifles. On the verge of unconsciousness, the witness was forced to clean his own blood from the floor and walls around him. Upon completion of this "task", the beating was resumed. During the course of the beatings, both of his cheek bones were smashed and the entire bone structure enclosing his upper teeth was loosened so much that his teeth protruded from his mouth. His release from the Alhos textile plant on 20 May was arranged by a sympathetic Serb soldier.

His next place of detention was the Zvornik court house, where guards did not molest the prisoners, but every day several Serb soldiers from outside the facility were allowed in to beat a few of the prisoners at random. According to the routine, the prisoners had to stand when these uniformed outsiders entered the room. Victims were selected quickly, then punched and kicked, frequently in the kidneys, sometimes until they lost consciousness.

On 4 June, the prisoners at the court house were moved to a neighbouring house and joined by another 120 Muslim detainees from a detention facility at the Celopek cultural centre. Here too, the daily beatings continued. During the approximately six weeks at that house, men from the Seselj unit carved crosses into the foreheads of 10 Muslim men. Another group of Bosnian Serb "police" also specialised in tightening wires around victims' necks.

On 15 July, most of the prisoners were bused to a detention facility in Batkovic. As soon as they arrived, the witness and others were beaten with sticks. The beatings were a regular part of life at the Batkovic facility. The witness was released from Serb detention on 1 October as part of a prisoner exchange. (Department of State)

August

A 40-year-old woman described how followers of Serbian leader Milan Martic selected women from her city and put hundreds of them in a school in Doboj.

> "In front of a few hundred prisoners they raped and tortured women and girls for days. It was unbearable to watch girls being raped in front of their fathers.
>
> "I was raped and tortured too, because they knew that I am a wife of a leader of the Muslim party. In August, some prisoners were exchanged, including me and my sons. Many women and girls who were pregnant remained in the camp. They were transferred to a hospital and fed twice a day because, as the Chetniks said, they had to bear their offspring." (The New York Times)

May-August

A 39-year-old Bosnian Muslim from Prijedor was held in Keraterm camp from 31 May until 5 August. Upon his arrival at Keraterm, one guard - whom he identified - used a knife to saw off the witness' left index finger at the first knuckle and chopped off the tip of his left ring finger.

During his detention, the witness saw four guards cut another prisoner across the face and torso with a knife. One of the guards cut off the bottom half of the man's left ear. After the beating, they left him in the room without any medical care. The man survived his injuries, but after a few days his wounds became infected, and the witness said he could see maggots moving around inside the open wounds. The witness believes the man remains in Prijedor.

The witness described another form of cruelty he witnessed at Keraterm. The Serbian guards gathered two-litre glass bottles from a nearby bottling plant. A bottle would be placed on the ground and a prisoner, trousers and underwear pulled down, would be forced to sit upon it. The guards would then push down on the prisoner's shoulders until the man's buttocks touched the ground, forcing the bottle all the way up the man's anus. Of the guards he said:

> "Whatever they imagined, they tried; if they liked the effect, they would do it to other prisoners." (Department of State)

May-August

A 36-year-old Serbian medical doctor was arrested on 5 May by Paraga's Black Shirts in Capljina. She was taken to Dretelj, a fuel storage garrison transformed into a detention facility for 64 female and 100 male detainees, where she witnessed torture and could identify some of the perpetrators.

"All men were mercilessly beaten at arrival and during all interrogations. They were hit with hands, feet, night sticks, two-by-fours and rifle butts. They were slashed with knives and degraded in every conceivable manner.

"(An) owner of several catering establishments, heavily overweight, was supposed to be transferred to another prison but was not because he literally could not be moved: he was so badly beaten.

"(Another) received about 50 blows to his head, which was badly gashed. Female fighters assisted in the beating by kicking him.

"During interrogation ... prisoners would be slapped, the tips of their fingers would be cut off, their fingers would be crushed.

"Needles were driven under my nails, I was cut with a 'kama' over the face and breasts. The treatment of women was in no way less inhuman than that of men. On the contrary, several women were raped, even some very old ones." (Archmandrite Simeon Biberdzic, Monastery of Ostrog)

18 June

A 42-year-old Muslim from Kevljani was interned at Omarska camp from 27 May until 28 August. On 18 or 19 June, he was called out of building No. 11 and taken to building No. 10, to a room with four soldiers.

The soldiers made the witness undress to his underwear, and lie down on his stomach on the tile floor. One guard took at iron chair, put it on his back and sat down. Another guard took a large calibre automatic rifle and beat him on his spine with the butt of the rifle, pounding each vertebrae twice. A third guard continually kicked him along his legs and groin. The other guard pounded his rib cage continuously, which resulted in the witness sustaining four broken ribs.

The witness lost consciousness but, when he awoke, the four guards were standing around him and began to beat him again, on his legs, shoulders and head. One guard took a police baton, straddled the witness' back, and beat his back and ribs continuously. He felt the pain of only the first 10 blows, then felt no more. Another guard pulled out a knife and said he would "circumcise" him. The guard then cut his knee cap, but the witness said he did not even feel the knife as he watched blood pour out of his leg. (Department of State)

June — A 22-year-old Serbian civilian from Drivusa was shot three times in his left arm when Bosnian Government Forces captured Serb positions in Zenica in June. He was beaten in Zenica camp for the first 10 days of his capture and still bore a scar on his leg where he had been cut "just for being a Serb". He witnessed the case of one elderly man who had stepped on a mine but received no medical treatment, and who was removed from the camp immediately before a visit by United Nations Human Rights Commission Special Rapporteur Tadeusz Mazowiecki. This inmate was returned after Mazowiecki's departure and died a few days later. Food and tea often were contaminated with soap. (Department of State)

Abuse of civilians in detention centres

1992 — A representative of the Zenica Centre for the Investigation of War Crimes claimed the centre had interviewed witnesses of rape and violence who described the rape of 30,000 women in Bosnia and Herzegovina. (Department of State)

August — A 12-year-old girl from Jelec was raped by several Serbian soldiers over nine nights at the Partizan Hall detention centre in Foca. On one occasion, a Serbian soldier raped the girl and her mother.

A 20-year-old woman, who had been raped by a Serb policeman, said that some 100 "young Muslim women and girls were raped" in Miljevina, an eastern Bosnian town described as a possible "rape camp". (Newsweek)

27 July — A 29-year-old Serbian civilian from Srebrenik was taken to Zenica camp on 27 July by Bosnian Government Forces. He was beaten continuously, every 10 minutes for 96 hours after his arrival, with ropes and sticks. He showed evidence of beatings, particularly on his head. He also reported deliberate contamination of food. (Department of State)

Impeding delivery of food and medical supplies to the civilian population

10 January 1993 — Bosnian Serb forces fired on United Kingdom troops escorting a United Nations aid convoy on 10 January near the town of Kladanj. (Reuters)

6 January — Bosnian Serb forces stopped United Nations attempts to repair the power grid in Sarajevo on 6 January, and prevented a load of firewood from entering Sarajevo. (Department of State)

December 1992

Bosnian Serbs in December continued to obstruct convoys of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to eastern Bosnia, to shell the Mostar Road and to endanger UNHCR personnel in Sarajevo via snipers and mortar attacks. The Bosnian Serbs also impeded deliveries to Bihac and the oversight of relief in Banja Luka.

Bosnian Croats interfered with UNHCR convoys on the Mostar-Sarajevo Road: at first the Bosnian Croats told UNHCR that the road was unsafe and could not be used. When UNHCR insisted that they would deal with the risk of Serb shelling, they were allowed to proceed, but have since been subject to frequent check-points, diversions to difficult back roads, insults at check-points and shooting in the air.

Bosnian Muslims frequently have shot at UNHCR vehicles and personnel and harassed UNHCR personnel at Muslim-manned barricades.

A major impediment to humanitarian shipments to Bosnian Government-controlled areas in December was the military activity initiated by Muslim forces in the Bratunac area, which halted relief supplies for Srebrenica, and in the Rogatica area, which blocked a convoy destined for Gorazde.

Serbian guards outside Banja Luka continued to harass relief workers, waving around rifles and pistols and prohibited them from distributing food. (Department of State)

12 December

Serbian gunmen on 12 December stopped a Belgrade-to-Sarajevo humanitarian aid convoy at Han Pijesak and threatened to kill the relief workers. (Paris, Agence France Presse (AFP))

1 December

Small arms fire pierced the stabiliser of a United States C-130 during an approach into Sarajevo airport on 1 December, which resulted in the temporary suspension of the UNHCR airlift. At least five planes participating in the humanitarian airlift have been hit by small arms fire since 4 November. (Department of State)

Deliberate attacks on non-combatants

16 December

A gunman shot a French soldier with United Nations forces in Bosnia and Hersegovina on 16 December while he was on guard at Sarajevo airport. (Paris, AFP)

While traveling to Sarajevo in an armored and marked United Nations vehicle, Hans Stercken, Bundestag deputy and Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, and a German embassy staff member were attached. The vehicle, which was driven by an Egyptian crew, was hit by several shots.

Stercken said the United Nations "could not have expressed more clearly" the identity of the vehicle; it was painted white and carried a United Nations sign. (Hamburg, German Press Agency (DPA))

6 December — A UNHCR representative's car in Prijedor was hit four times by bullets on 6 December. (Department of State)

5 December — A mortar round that hit Sarajevo's airport terminal on 5 December wounded two Portuguese police attached to the United Nations peace-keeping mission. The shelling of the airport continued throughout the day. (Reuters)

4 December — During a battle for Otes during the first week of December, two United Nations planes were shot at, the United Nations headquarters in Sarajevo was shelled and the radar at the airport, south-west of the capital, was destroyed by artillery fire. (Paris, AFP)

Wanton devastation and destruction of property

27 May — A 42-year-old Muslim described the Serbian attack on Kevljani on 26 May. The villagers fled to the woods, but after spending the night under heavy shelling, many women wanted to surrender. The witness and an imam led a group of women and children under a white flag to the school to surrender.

A Serbian officer nicknamed Cigo, who was the head of the tank regiment that attacked Kevljani, told the group the whole village had two hours to surrender. The witness said he surrendered to Cigo all the weapons the group had, in hopes that the village would be spared. The Serbian army, however, burned most houses to the ground. They sent all Muslims and Croatians in buses to Prijedor. (Department of State)

June — The Orthodox Bishop of Hersegovina testified publicly on 28 September that the regular army of the Republic of Croatia from the coast and Croatian armed forces from western Hersegovina from the beginning of June had destroyed the following property in his diocese:

(a) The Orthodox cathedral and Episcopal headquarters in Mostar, on 15 and 16 June;

(b) Churches in Bjelo Polje, Bobani plateau, Capljina, Dubrovnik, Duvno, Gabela, Metkovic, Stolac, Zacula and Zalanik;

(c) The Serbian villages of Brdjani, Zukici, Djepi (or Cepi), Blace, Vrdolje, Zagorice, Zivanje, Ljuta, Ovcari, Ribari, Sitnik, Donje Selo, Cerici, Bjelovcani, Celebici, Pokojiste, Obri, Nevizdraci, Idbor, Ostrozac, Dobrigosce, Paprasko, Repovac, Shunje, Hondici, Gnojnica, Buna, Hodbina and Pijesci;

(d) The fifteenth century Byzantine-style monastery at Zavala, the sixteenth century Byzantine-style monastery at Zitomislic and the Serbian villages of Tasovcic, Klepci and Prebilovci on the east bank of the Neretva River, where, on 7 and 8 June, the church with the bones of almost 2,000 Serbian people killed between 1941 and 1945 was burned down and plowed into the ground. (Orthodox Bishop of Hersegovina)

Other, including mass forcible expulsion and deportation of civilians

12 January 1993 — As many as 35,000 men, women and children risk death by illness and starvation in Zepa. Bosnian Serbs refuse to permit food, medicines and other supplies into the town. To this date, they are not allowing any United Nations humanitarian aid convoys into Zepa. (Department of State)

5 January — A social worker in a Medzarici nursing home, located in a Serb-held section of Sarajevo, said that 10 of his patients had died in the past 36 hours, and that 26 residents of the home had died in the past two weeks for lack of heating. He also said that snipers or direct hits on the building had caused the death of 20 to 25 residents since April 1992. According to a UNHCR official, the nursing home was without water, electricity or heating. Most utility services in Sarajevo (electricity, natural gas and water) are under Serbian control. (The Washington Post) (Associated Press) (Department of State)

December 1992 — Serbian "police" in United Nations protected areas Sector East during the first two weeks of December expelled 65 non-Serbs from Baranja, mostly from Darda, Bilje and Knezevi Vinogradi. Another 24 families were under heavy Serbian "police" pressure to leave Knezevi Vinogradi. (Department of State)

5 December — A Muslim man, who reported that only 3,000 Muslims remained in Sanski Most where 15,000 had lived, described recent attacks by armed Serbs:

> "They robbed us. They took the cars, the bicycles. The police now drive my personal car. They said if we did not give the cars, they would take us to the camps."

The man said that Serb militia forces continued to shell villages surrounding Sanski Most every night. (The Washington Post)

December — Members of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) civil police escorted to Zadar the last six Croats from Zemunik Gornji, four elderly women and two older men. They said they had been living in a virtual prison and fled to save their lives. All Croatian homes in the area have been destroyed, except for two. (Department of State)

25 May — A 33-year-old Muslim from Prijedor watched Serbian forces bringing in heavy tanks and cannons to Kozarac on 25 May. Many villagers escaped to a nearby house in the woods, where they hid in a basement shelter. At noon, those in hiding organized the women, children and wounded in groups of 30, bearing white flags, to surrender to the Serbs. The Serbian army fired on some of the groups attempting to surrender.

The witness watched soldiers loot and burn houses, cars and whatever else they found. He saw Serbian tanks fire on private homes. The men eventually were separated from the women and children and taken to Trnopolje. (Department of State)

Notes

1/ United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 75, Nos. 970-973.